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Footnotes 
1. No. 239736, 2003 WL 734257 (Mich. App. March 4, 2003) (per
curiam).
2. No. 07-2035, 2009 WL 1143167 (10th Cir. April 29, 2009) (per
curiam).
3. CONST., art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
4. See CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the Interstate, Foreign Nations, and
Indian Commerce Clauses).
5. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian
Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L. J. 1 (1997).
6. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Trade and Intercourse Acts, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED STATES INDIAN LAW AND POLICY 762-64
(Paul Finkelman &Tim Alan Garrison eds., 2009).
7. See Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13.
8. 21 U.S. 543 (1923).
9. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
10. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
11. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
State and federal courts increasingly are being confrontedwith prosecutors moving the court to consider prior con-victions in American Indian tribal courts during the sen-
tencing phase, and sometimes earlier. For example, in People v.
Wemigwans,1 the Michigan Court of Appeals allowed the use of
a defendant’s two prior tribal court convictions to support a
state-law felony charge for drunk driving, third offense. But in
United States v. Lente,2 a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit
noted that prior tribal court convictions (that apparently were
uncounseled) for drunk driving did not support an upward
departure under the federal sentencing guidelines. If the con-
viction being introduced occurred in state or federal court, the
instant court would be obligated to give full faith and credit to
that conviction.3 But if the prior conviction occurred in a tribal
court, state and federal courts are often confronted with unfore-
seen complexities.
This article is intended to parse through much of the politi-
cal baggage associated with recognizing tribal court convic-
tions. To be frank, the law is unsettled, leaving little guidance
for state and federal judges in these cases, while at the same
time granting enormous discretion to judges on the questions
involved. The first part of this article will provide a quick
overview of the constitutional status of Indian tribes and tribal
courts, as well providing a basic but sufficient introduction to
relevant principles of federal Indian law. The second part will
offer a summary of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country and,
in particular, what role tribes play – and how well they play it.
The third part offers a short description of the key cases in the
field, as well as relevant federal and state statutes, and state
court rules. It also offers a short normative argument on the
question of what state and federal court judges who are con-
fronted with prior tribal court convictions should look for in
these cases, especially where the defendants convicted in tribal
court are not represented by counsel.
I. INDIAN TRIBES AS A THIRD SOVEREIGN IN THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
There are three kinds of sovereigns in the United States –
federal, state, and tribal. The Constitution delineates the
authorities, duties, and limitations of the United States in rela-
tion to the state governments, but the structure and text of the
Constitution provide for two other kinds of sovereign entity –
foreign nations and Indian tribes.4 Foreign nations, of course,
are not part of the American constitutional structure, but
Indian tribes, which are located within the boundaries of the
United States, are part of the American constitutional structure,
albeit an unusual part. As Justice O’Connor once stated, they
are the “third sovereign.”5
The constitutional text, as provided for by the practice of
Congress before the ratification of the Constitution, provides
for two means by which Indian tribes and the United States will
interact. First, the so-called Indian Commerce Clause provides
that Congress has authority to regulate commerce with the
Indian tribes. One of the first acts of the First Congress was to
implement the Indian Commerce Clause in the Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1790.6 And the federal government’s treaty
power provides the second form by which the United States
deals with Indian tribes – by treaty. One of the earliest treaties
executed and ratified by the United States came during the
Revolutionary War in a treaty with the Delaware Nation.7 There
are over 200 valid and extant treaties between the United States
and various Indian tribes.
The Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the Indian
Commerce Clause and how the Clause interacts with Indian
treaties in the so-called Marshall Trilogy of early Indian law
cases. In Johnson v. M’Intosh,8 an early Indian lands case, Chief
Justice Marshall held that the federal government had exclusive
dominion over affairs with Indian tribes – exclusive as to indi-
vidual American citizens and, implicitly, as to state government.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,9 Chief Justice Marshall’s plurality
asserted that while Indian tribes were not state governments as
defined in the Constitution, nor were they foreign nations, they
were something akin to “domestic … nations.” And, finally, in
Worcester v. Georgia,10 Chief Justice Marshall confirmed that the
laws of states have “no force” in Indian Country, and that the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause gave powerful effect to Indian
treaties as “the supreme law of the land.” However, largely
because Congress has authority to abrogate ratified treaties,
Congress may also abrogate Indian treaty rights, as the Supreme
Court recognized in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.11
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12. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1941); see
also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 2 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2005).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
14. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004).
15. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9.
16. See Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Indian
Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 73 FED. REG. 18553 (April
4, 2008).
17. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 22.02,
at 1346-55 (Nell Jessup Newton et al., eds. 2005) (Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act); id. § 22.04, at
1375-87 (Indian Health Service); id. § 22.05, at 1387-1400 (hous-
ing).
18. E.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v.
Office of the United States Attorney for the Western District of
Michigan, 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 926 (W.D. Mich. 2002).
19. See The Federalist No. 42, at 284-85 (Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
20. See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27
CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1149 (1995).
21. From these actions arose the so-called Eastern Land Claims that
still cost Congress and the northeastern states enormous time and
expense. See generally Robert N. Clinton & Margaret T. Hotopp,
Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian
Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L. REV. 17
(1979).
22. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1831).
The constitutional text, Indian treaties, acts of Congress, and
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence can be reduced to three gen-
eral, fundamental principles of federal Indian law:
• First, Congress’s authority over Indian affairs is plenary and
exclusive.
• Second, state governments have no authority to regulate
Indian affairs absent express congressional delegation or
grant.
• Third, the sovereign authority of Indian tribes is inherent,
and not delegated or granted by the United States, but can be
limited or restricted by Congress.12
The key element of these three principles is the legal term of
art, “Indian Country,” which is defined by act of Congress to
include all reservation lands and other kinds of Indian lands.13
These three principles, generally, are in strongest force within
the boundaries of Indian Country.
It is useful to examine these three principles in detail to
understand how they operate in modern federal Indian law and
policy. First, Congress’s plenary and exclusive power allows
Congress to enact statutes defining the “metes and bounds” of
tribal and state sovereignty in Indian affairs.14 Congress has
delegated enormous authority to implement federal Indian
policy to the executive branch, particularly the Secretary of
Interior.15
It is the federal government’s plenary power over Indian
affairs that provide the authority for the United States to recog-
nize Indian tribes. There are 562 federally recognized Indian
tribes.16 Many of these tribes are signatories to treaties with the
United States. Many of these tribes have been recognized by an
act of Congress or federal court order. And still others have
been recognized by the Department of Interior. There are many
others – no one knows how many, but likely relatively few –
that are not (but should be) federally recognized. The federal
government recognizes the inherent sovereignty of these 562
Indian tribes. 
This federal recognition has import in many, many ways.
For example, Congress appropriates money to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, the Indian Health Service, and the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, each of which then spend
that money (or deliver that money) to federally recognized
tribes, who use the money to operate tribal government ser-
vices ranging from health
care to public safety to
housing to employment
training and education,
and many other services.17
Indian tribes also use their
own, independently gener-
ated revenues to fund these
programs.18 Key govern-
ment services paid for by
federal and tribal money
includes courts of record developed and operated by the tribes,
law enforcement departments, and jail facilities.
Second, there is a long tradition of excluding state gov-
ernments from Indian Country, dating back to the
Constitution. According to James Madison, one of the serious
flaws of the Articles of Incorporation was the failure of the
Articles to exclude state governments from Indian affairs.19
States began competing with the federal government for the
right to acquire Indian lands and to control Indian com-
merce, creating tension among the states and with the United
States government. The lack of federal control over Indian
affairs weakened the nation’s position in relation to Great
Britain, France, and Spain, each of which had significant and
powerful allies among the Indian nations. The Framers
intended the so-called Indian Commerce Clause to exclude
state governments from the field of Indian commerce, while
the federal government’s treaty power would be used to deal
with Indian tribes as independent sovereign nations.20 The
First Congress enacted the Trade and Intercourse Act as a
means to implement the Indian Commerce Clause. But states
continued to assert authority to deal in Indian affairs, includ-
ing executing treaties with Indian tribes, negotiating major
Indian land purchases, and asserting their police powers on
Indian lands, but they did so in violation of federal law.21 The
situation came to a head in the Cherokee cases, in which the
Supreme Court finally declared the State of Georgia’s efforts
to legally and politically destroy the Cherokee Nation null
and void. The Court held that state laws had “no force” in
Indian Country.22
In the modern era, the notion that state laws have no force
in Indian Country is riddled with exceptions, both statutory
[S]tate governments
have no authority 
to regulate 
Indian affairs 
absent express 
congressional 
delegation or grant. 
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and in the common law, but
the general rule remains.23
States may not tax the on-
reservation income,24 the
land,25 or the property of indi-
vidual Indians,26 and have no
authority over Indian tribes
whatsoever.27 States have no
authority to regulate Indian
lands, except in extremely
narrow circumstances.28 State
courts have no jurisdiction
over civil cases brought
against individual Indians for disputes arising in Indian
Country, with limited exceptions.29 And states have no author-
ity to prosecute on-reservation crimes committed by Indians,
also with limited exceptions.30
The limited exception relevant here is a statute commonly
referred to as Public Law 280, a 1953 congressional act extend-
ing state government civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian
Country in five states, and authorizing other states to assert
jurisdiction if they chose.31 Other than the six mandatory states
– California, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Wisconsin,
with Alaska being added upon statehood in 1959 – several
other states chose to assert jurisdiction over some classes of
crimes. Congress removed federal jurisdiction in these areas at
the same time. However, as a general matter, Public Law 280
was a failure on the ground. Congress did not appropriate
money for the mandatory states to take over Indian Country
criminal-law enforcement, and many areas of Indian Country
literally became lawless as a result.32 Recent and ongoing stud-
ies have concluded that Public Law 280 may actually have
increased crime rates in Indian Country, and surely have
decreased tribal-state cooperation.33
The third major federal Indian law principle is the inherent
sovereignty of Indian tribes. It is a common misconception that
Indian treaties were a grant of land and authority to Indian
tribes, when the reverse is true. Indian treaties are reservations
of land and authority by Indian tribes. If a tribe did not relin-
quish a sovereign right in the treaty, it remains.34 The exception
to this rule is that Congress has authority, according to the
Supreme Court, to divest aspects of tribal sovereignty if it so
wishes.35 And finally, the Supreme Court has asserted in recent
decades the authority to divest Indian tribes of authority.36
Because Indian tribes have independent and inherent sover-
eignty, tribes retain the authority to make laws and be ruled by
them.37 Since before the beginning of the American Republic,
some Indian tribes have exercised their sovereignty to enact
criminal codes, establish courts, and exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion over individuals, Indian and non-Indian. Indian nations
long have exercised non-Anglo-style law-enforcement author-
ity, and some still do exercise this kind of governmental author-
ity. It was the Cherokee Nation of Georgia in the 1820s that
likely was the first Indian nation to establish a written consti-
tution and criminal code, a court system, and a formalized law-
enforcement mechanism. By the 1970s, only several dozen
Indian nations exercised criminal jurisdiction over individu-
als.38 And now, perhaps three hundred Indian nations exercise
criminal jurisdiction, or soon will.39
II. TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TRIBAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION
Relatively simple fundamental principles of federal Indian
law tend to fall by the wayside on the ground. Often, it is not
23. The Supreme Court in 1973 stated, “The modern cases thus tend
to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to
look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define
the limits of state power.” McClanahan v. State Tax Commission
of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). But the Court still held,
after parsing through the relevant treaties and Acts of Congress,
that Arizona’s taxation of the income of reservation Indians was
invalid. See id. at 165. 
24. See Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S.
114, 124 (1993).
25. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164; Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
26. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 377 (1978).
27. Indian tribes are immune from suit by state governments in any
court, absent their consent or an act of Congress. See Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498
U.S. 505, 509-10 (1991).
28. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332
(1983).
29. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1959).
30. See, e.g., Langley v. Ryder, 778 F.2d 1092, 1095 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208
n.17 (1978)).
31. Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588. See generally COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 17, §6.04[3], at
544-81. Before this statute, Congress had extended state criminal
jurisdiction to Indian Country in Kansas and New York. See id. §
6.04[4][a], at 581-83 (New York); id. § 6.04[4][b], at 583-84
(Kansas, and some reservations in Iowa and North Dakota).
32. See Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State
Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975).
33. See Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit
for the Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV.
697 (2006).
34. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (holding
that Indian treaties are “not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a
grant of rights from them—a reservation of those not granted.”).
35. E.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (holding in dicta
that Congress can divest Indian tribes and individual Indians of
the authority to alienate certain forms of Indian property).
36. E.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)
(holding that Indian tribes have no authority to prosecute non-
Indians, even absent an Act of Congress stating so); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that Indian tribes
have no civil regulatory authority over nonmembers unless non-
member activity meets one of two limited exceptions).
37. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1959).
38. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 n.7
(1978).
39. See Bureau of Justice Assistance, Pathways to Justice: Building and
Sustaining Tribal Justice Systems in Contemporary America 6
(October 2005), available at http://www.law.und.edu/tji/
web_assets/pdf/PathwaysReport.pdf. 
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40. See Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A
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41. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 13.
44. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Addressing the Epidemic of Domestic
Violence in Indian Country by Restoring Tribal Sovereignty,
American Constitutional Society Issue Brief 5-7 (March 2009),
available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Fletcher%20Issue%20
Brief.pdf.
45. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
46. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).
47. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 17, §
9.07, at 764 n.235 (citing Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d
1176 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Haskins, 887 P.2d 1189 (Mont.
1994); Ryder v. State, 648 P.2d 774 (N.M. 1982); State v.
Pamperien, 967 P.2d 503 (Or. App. 1998); Primeaux v. Leapley,
502 N.W.2d 265 (S.D. 1993); State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332
(Wash. 1993)).
48. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian
Country, 53 FED. LAW., March/April 2006, at 38; Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State
Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73 (2007).
49. E.g., Deputization Agreement Between the Grand Traverse Band of
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and Leelanau County, March 19,
1997, http://www.ncai.org/ncai/resource/agreements/mi_grand_
traverse_deputization-3-19-1997.pdf.
50. E.g., MICH. CT. RULE 2.615.
easy to know where “Indian Country” begins and ends in every
situation. Moreover, since many American Indians by blood are
not enrolled with a federally recognized Indian tribe, it is often
not clear who is an Indian victim or perpetrator. Congress has
experimented with granting a few state governments criminal
and civil jurisdiction over some areas of Indian Country. And
there are three kinds of sovereigns charged with authority to
investigate and prosecute crime in Indian Country. Indian
Country criminal jurisdiction is accurately described as a
“maze.”40
In states where no act of Congress such as Public Law 280
has conferred criminal jurisdiction onto the state government,
the primary sovereign with felony jurisdiction is the federal
government. Under a mishmash of statutes, such as the Major
Crimes Act,41 the Indian Country Crimes Act,42 and the
Assimilative Crimes Act,43 the United States has jurisdiction
over all Indian Country crimes perpetrated against Indians or
tribal property. Federal prosecutors have exclusive jurisdiction
over Indian Country crimes committed by non-Indians.
Unfortunately, local United States Attorneys’ Offices often are
ill-equipped to deal with Indian Country crime. Budgetary,
political, and geographic difficulties impede federal law
enforcement, especially in the government’s misdemeanor
docket. Very, very few misdemeanor crimes committed by non-
Indians in Indian Country are ever seriously investigated, let
alone prosecuted. In recent years, there has been an explosion
of violence against Indian women as well as dramatic increases
in methamphetamine dealing and possession in Indian Country
that many have attributed at least partially to the lack of effec-
tive federal law enforcement.44
Indian tribes may assert jurisdiction over all crimes com-
mitted by Indians within Indian Country, but they have no
jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians.45
Moreover, Congress has severely reduced tribal sentencing
authority to one year in jail and a $5,000 fine, effectively lim-
iting tribal criminal jurisdiction to misdemeanors.46 And
Congress’s acquiescence in the Supreme Court’s determination
that Indian tribes cannot have criminal prosecution over non-
Indians has allowed a veritable criminal loophole to grow over
the past 30 years. Tribal police at least have the authority to
detain suspects even if the tribe does not have criminal juris-
diction over them.47
Even in states that have criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Country, Indian Country crimes rates remain high. State inves-
tigators and prosecutors
have the same difficulties
that the federal govern-
ment has in prosecuting
Indian Country crime.
Local police often are not
local to Indian Country,
nor do local prosecutors
have political incentives to
spend state resources on
Indian Country, which
does not contribute much
to the local tax base.
However, in the past 30
years or so, the capacity of Indian tribes to investigate and
enforce their own criminal laws is growing exponentially. Tribal
gaming money, coupled with federal grants and appropriations,
helped to fuel this growth. Moreover, congressional legislation
such as the Indian Civil Rights Act and the various Indian Self-
Determination Acts has encouraged tribal governments to
become more capable of governing. Finally, several of the
Supreme Court’s Indian law decisions, even ones that are skep-
tical of tribal sovereignty, have helped to encourage Indian
tribes to develop tribal court systems and law-enforcement
departments.
The growth and development of tribal law-enforcement
capacity has spurred, though often very grudgingly, cooperation
between Indian tribes, states, and local units of government.48
In many states, the State of Michigan being a prime example,
Indian tribes routinely enter into law-enforcement cooperative
agreements with municipal governments.49 These intergovern-
mental agreements may take many forms, with the cross-depu-
tization agreements being one of the most common. In areas of
Indian Country where reservation boundaries are not well-
defined or even are contested by the parties, intergovernmental
agreements blur or even erase the jurisdictional lines and help
to avoid the serious problem of criminal suspects getting off
because of a jurisdictional technicality.
Coupled with law-enforcement cooperative agreements,
tribal courts and state courts also are routinely entering into
agreements, usually represented by tribal and state court rules,
in which the courts will recognize the judgments of the other
courts along the lines of the comity given to the courts of for-
eign nations.50 However, in some states and in some areas of
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51. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (Indian Child Welfare Act); 28 U.S.C. §
1738A (Violence Against Women Act).
52. S. 797, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1924, 111th Cong. (2009).
53. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(i).
54. United States v. Red Bird, 146 F. Supp. 2d 993, 998-99 (D. S.D.
2001) (discussing United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769 (6th Cir.
1997); other citations omitted). Judge Kornmann later wrote that
he opposed amending the United States Sentencing Guidelines to
treat tribal court convictions in the same manner as state or local
misdemeanor convictions. See Charles Kornmann, Commentary
on Reconsidering the Commission’s Treatment of Tribal Courts, 17
FED. SENTENCING RPTR. 222 (2005).
55. Doherty, 126 F.3d at 780 (citing Hearings on S. 961-968 and S.J.
Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965)).
law, the judgments of tribal
courts must be given the same
full faith and credit as state
and federal courts give each
other. The Violence Against
Women Act and the Indian
Child Welfare Act, for exam-
ple, require state and tribal
courts to give full faith and
credit to each other’s judg-
ments and orders for purpose
of enforcing those Acts.51
Finally, there is the likelihood in the coming years that
Congress will see fit to expand current contours of tribal 
criminal jurisdiction to increase tribal sentencing capacity or
even to restore tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for
certain classes of crimes. Given the spectacular increase in
Indian Country crime, it is likely that Congress will take some
action, but it is not clear what Congress will choose to do. The
leading discussion bill currently is the so-called Tribal Law and
Order Act, which would expand tribal criminal-sentencing
capacity to three years for some crimes.52
III. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF TRIBAL COURT
CONVICTIONS AND COMITY
As Indian tribes develop the capacity to investigate and pros-
ecute Indian Country crime, state and federal courts are
increasingly faced with the question of how to handle prior
tribal court convictions. As the two cases mentioned in the
introduction suggest, there are multiple ways of handling these
prior convictions. As some Michigan courts have done, the
court could recognize the tribal court conviction for purposes
of sentencing or establishing a prior criminal history. Or as
some states and federal courts have done, the court could
ignore those prior convictions. There are plusses and minuses
to each path.
The United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines allow, but
do not require, federal courts to consider prior tribal court con-
victions for purposes of sentencing.53 As such, federal judges
have significant discretion on the weight to place on tribal court
convictions. Federal judges who know nothing about tribal
courts, understandably, might be less inclined to give them
much weight. The few federal judges who do know something
about tribal courts have a great deal to teach other judges.
Consider South Dakota federal district court Judge Charles
Kornmann’s commentary about criminal trials in the Rosebud
Sioux Tribal Court:
This Court respectfully disagrees with the statements
in [United States v.] Doherty that tribal court proceedings
are informal and not adversarial and that Congress did
not wish to impose on such systems “an exclusionary
rule that presumes the existence of an adversarial
method of trying criminal cases.” … I have no informa-
tion as to how a tribal court serving a total tribal mem-
bership of 300 people works in the upper peninsula of
Michigan. I do have knowledge how tribal courts dealing
with thousands of Native Americans work in South
Dakota. In particular, I have knowledge and take judicial
notice as to how the tribal court in Rosebud works. I am
also aware that federal courts are obligated to extend
respect and act with principles of comity toward tribal
courts. I decline to jump to the assumptions or conclu-
sions advanced in Doherty that tribal courts, and by
extension the tribal court on the Rosebud, operate as
something of a family gathering and counseling session.
The description of the tribal court in Doherty sounds,
very frankly, like a description of “teen courts” now in
vogue in various high schools. That is not the way the
Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court works in South Dakota and
it is clear that, at least in the present case, criminal adver-
sarial judicial proceedings had been initiated. Red Bird,
unlike Doherty, had more than “the mere existence of a
statutory right to counsel….” Nor is there any evidence
or argument to suggest that tribal court criminal prose-
cutions in South Dakota and particularly in Rosebud are
not adversary proceedings. They are “adversary judicial
criminal proceedings.” … They are certainly adversarial
in the eyes of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe or a public
defender’s office would not have been established and
funded. While sentences resulting from tribal court con-
victions are not counted in computing the criminal his-
tory of a defendant who is later to be sentenced in federal
court, they may be considered under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3
(adequacy of criminal history category). See U.S.S.G. §
4A1.2 (i). The government sometimes argues for an
upward departure based upon a defendant’s previous
convictions or even charges pending in tribal court. Such
convictions are certainly matters to be considered by the
sentencing judge.54
The Sixth Circuit in Doherty had cited to the legislative his-
tory of the Indian Civil Rights Act where “[w]itnesses … testi-
fied that a wholesale exportation of the Sixth Amendment to
the tribes would be not be [sic] feasible; since many tribes do
not have prosecutorial systems, but instead rely on informal
and non-adversarial questioning from the tribal courts, the
introduction of outside defense counsel could ‘disrupt the
entire court system.’”55 Incidentally, Michigan’s modern tribal
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INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 82-89 (1983).
61. See JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL
LEGAL STUDIES 247-48 (2004).
62. See JOHN R. WUNDER, “RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE”: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 240 (1994); see also
United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 780 (6th Cir. 1997) (“In
particular, tribal representatives testified that their governments
could not afford to provide counsel to indigent defendants, and
that a bill that required them to do so without providing for fed-
eral funding would be disastrous.”).
63. 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
64. 71 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Mont.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1008 (2003).
courts are adversarial courts much like the South Dakota tribal
courts described by Judge Kornmann.56
The critical question is the right to indigent counsel. As the
Supreme Court long ago recognized in Talton v. Mayes,57 Indian
tribes are not subject to the Constitution, having not been party
to the Convention nor having ratified the text. As such, at least
until 1968, Indian tribes are not beholden to the Constitution’s
criminal-procedure duties. In 1968, Congress purported to
apply the Bill of Rights to Indian tribes in the Indian Civil
Rights Act, also known as the Indian Bill of Rights.58 But the
key question is the substantive deviations of the Indian Bill of
Rights to the Constitution; namely, the fact that the Indian Bill
of Rights does not contain a right to indigent legal defense.59
It is worth recalling the legal landscape in 1968 in Indian
Country. In 1968, many tribal courts were creatures of the fed-
eral government, so-called Courts of Indian Offenses (CIOs) or
CFR Courts created and regulated by the Department of
Interior.60 These courts enforced Law and Order Codes, also
promulgated by the Department of Interior, and usually a local
Bureau of Indian Affairs official dominated the proceedings. In
many CIOs or CFR Courts, the tribal judge was not law-
trained, the tribal prosecutor was also the tribal chief of police,
and lawyers were not allowed in the tribal courtroom. In the
hearings leading up to the Indian Civil Rights Act, many tribal
witnesses complained of abuses by tribal judges and tribal
police officers though, to be fair, these stories were anecdotal
and outnumbered by complaints about abuses by federal and
state officials.61 In the lead up to the passage of the Act, the
Department of Interior and Department of Justice complained
that a right to indigent counsel would require the United States
to foot the bill for public defenders, and so Congress did not
mandate the right to indigent counsel.62 Importantly, however,
Congress did authorize the right to counsel, effectively wiping
out tribal laws (often pushed through by federal officers) ban-
ning lawyers in tribal courts.
Modern tribal courts are nothing like the CIOs and CFR
Courts. More and more tribal judges are lawyers, and those
non-law-trained tribal judges often have lawyer clerks or con-
sultants. More and more tribal governments provide for public
defenders, although that number is still a distinct minority.
More and more tribal courts are conducting jury trials with
juries consisting of people representative of the tribal commu-
nity, including non-Indians. And modern tribal courts are
courts of record, with tribal court opinions being generated and
published in periodicals like
the Indian Law Reporter, and
online on tribal court web-
sites and on VersusLaw and
Westlaw.
Luckily, there are a few
valuable cases from which
state judges can draw upon
to determine whether to give
credence to a prior uncoun-
seled tribal court conviction. The cases roughly follow two par-
allel tracks. In the first track, the court weighs the impact of
assessing the prior conviction on the tribe’s sovereignty. In the
second track, the court applies the analysis of Nichols v. United
States, a 1994 Supreme Court opinion.63
The first track tends to focus on the tribal sovereignty
aspects of considering a prior uncounseled tribal court convic-
tion. In State v. Spotted Eagle, for example, the Montana
Supreme Court held that prior uncounseled misdemeanor tribal
court convictions may be used in Montana courts for purpose
of sentencing:
Montana judicial policy avoids interfering with the
tribal courts and the respective tribe’s sovereignty. … This
Court treats tribal court judgments with the same defer-
ence as those of foreign sovereigns as a matter of comity.
… In most instances, comity requires this Court to give
full effect to the judgments of foreign sovereigns.…
Comity requires that a court give full effect to the valid
judgments of a foreign jurisdiction according to that sov-
ereign’s laws, not the Sixth Amendment standard that
applies to proceedings in Montana.
To disregard a valid tribal court conviction would
imply that Montana only recognizes the Blackfeet Tribe’s
right to self-government until it conflicts with Montana
law. Moreover, it would suggest that Montana recognizes
the legitimacy of the judgments of the tribal courts to the
extent that the procedures mirror Montana procedure.
Such a position would contradict the judicial policy of
this state and indirectly undermine the sovereignty of the
Blackfeet Tribe.64
There was a lone dissenter in the 4-1 decision, who rhetori-
cally stated: “In true oxymoronic fashion, our Court has said to
Mr. Spotted Eagle, ‘Out of deference to your Tribe, we accord
...Indian tribes are
not subject to the
Constitution, having
not been party 
to the Convention
nor having ratified
the text.
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you fewer protections than guar-
anteed to individual citizens by
the Montana Constitution.’”65
There is some scholarly dispute
about whether deference to tribal
sovereignty is sufficient to justify
the consideration of prior
uncounseled tribal court convic-
tions in federal court for sentencing purposes,66 but there are
more sound constitutional reasons that will allow state and fed-
eral courts to set adequate standards for the consideration of
tribal court convictions. To understand the argument, it is
worth assessing how Nichols v. United States may affect the
analysis.
The Spotted Eagle Court relied upon a Tenth Circuit deci-
sion, United States v. Benally, which reached the same conclu-
sion without significant analysis, other than to note that tribes
are not required to provide paid counsel to indigent defen-
dants.67 The Tenth Circuit also has held that guilty pleas before
tribal courts may be introduced in federal courts for purposes
of direct impeachment of defendant testimony.68 A more recent
Tenth Circuit opinion rejected a claim that to consider prior
uncounseled tribal court convictions was a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, relying heavily on Nichols.69
In Nichols, the Court held that that prior uncounseled fed-
eral court convictions could be used for sentencing purposes if
no prison term resulted from the prior conviction.70 The Eighth
Circuit refused to consider prior uncounseled tribal court con-
victions in United States v. Norquay,71 but that opinion was later
abrogated by the court in a non-Indian-law-related case.72 In
Norquay, the court (speaking without the benefit of the Nichols
decision), stated:
The Supreme Court has stated that misdemeanor con-
victions obtained in the absence of counsel for the defen-
dant may not be used as a basis for enhancing a sentence
of imprisonment to be imposed upon a defendant.… At
least one appellate court has held, in addition, that where
a defendant was not represented by counsel at tribal court
proceedings, any consequent tribal court conviction may
not be used as a basis for upward departure. United States
v. Brady…. We believe this is to be a correct statement of
the law.73
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Brady, referenced in
Norquay, held that prior uncounseled tribal court convictions
resulting in imprisonment could not be used by federal courts
for sentencing purposes.74 The court wrote:
[B]oth of Brady’s convictions were obtained in
uncounseled proceedings. The Sixth Amendment
requires that “no indigent criminal defendant be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has
afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel
in his defense.” ... We agree … that an “uncounseled mis-
demeanor conviction [may] not be used collaterally to
impose an increased term of imprisonment upon a subse-
quent conviction.” ...
The government’s main argument is that the prior
tribal convictions played only a small role in the depar-
ture. Because the sentencing court did not indicate the
extent each factor played in the sentence departure, it is
impossible to determine the precise sentence enhance-
ment attributable to the court’s reliance on the uncoun-
seled convictions. Nonetheless, we hold that any term of
imprisonment imposed on the basis of an uncounseled
conviction where the defendant did not waive counsel
violates the Sixth Amendment….75
The Brady opinion predates the Nichols decision and there-
fore may be suspect, but the reasoning should survive. In Brady,
the court noted that the prior tribal court convictions resulted
in jail terms, albeit shorter than 30 days.76 But under Nichols,
the key is whether the prior uncounseled convictions resulted
in jail terms, and so the outcome in Brady would have been
same even after Nichols.77
As such, while there is no definitive Supreme Court statement on
the subject, it is likely that federal courts may use prior uncoun-
seled tribal court convictions, so long as those convictions did not
result in jail time.
How does this affect state courts? Well, it doesn’t, because
state courts should consider their own constitutional rights and
rules. For example, in a case decided before Nichols, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Watchman refused to con-
sider prior uncounseled tribal court convictions.78 However, a
later NM appellate court overruled Watchman after Nichols (a
non-Indian law case); thus, Watchman may no longer be good
law.79
[S]tate courts
should consider
their own 
constitutional
rights and rules.
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That brings us to the Michigan Court of Appeals in People v.
Wemigwans.80 The court there, in an unpublished per curiam
opinion, described the workings of a modern typical modern
American tribal court:
There are many significant similarities between the
criminal procedure followed in the tribal court and the
procedure followed in Michigan courts. The record estab-
lishes that defendant was informed of the following
rights and opportunities: to be informed of the nature
and the cause of the accusations against him; to be con-
fronted with witnesses against him; to have a speedy and
public trial in which he could present witnesses in his
favor; to have a trial by jury, in which the government has
the burden to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt; to be protected against self-incrimination and to
be free from the threat of double jeopardy; to have coun-
sel at his own expense; and to be protected against cruel
or unusual punishment, excessive bails, or fines. Indian
Civil Rights Act, 25 USC § 1302. These rights are sub-
stantially similar to rights afforded defendants in
Michigan courts.
The tribal court informed defendant of his rights prior
to accepting each of his guilty pleas. In both prior cases
before the tribal court, the tribal judge tested defendant’s
competency before accepting his pleas. The record estab-
lishes that defendant acted freely, made a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the many rights that were enumer-
ated to him prior to his pleas, and made an intelligent,
informed and conscious decision to plead guilty in each
case. In so doing, defendant received the benefit of sen-
tencing agreements that eliminated the threat of long-
term incarceration. In addition to the protections of the
Indian Civil Rights Act, defendant had, among other
things, the right to access the tribal appellate courts.
Saginaw Chippewa Tribal Code §§ 1.513, 1.514.
Defendant elected not to assert his right to seek appeal of
the tribal convictions.81
Of import, while the tribal court in Wemigwans had sen-
tenced the defendant to 60 days in jail, the sentence was sus-
pended, bringing the case into the Nichols framework.82 The
Michigan appellate court reviewed the convictions under prin-
ciples of comity, as would be used for any foreign court judg-
ment, and concluded that despite the uncounseled character of
the convictions, Michigan courts could use them:
The only significant difference between the procedural
process afforded in the two judicial systems, as pointed
out by the trial court, relates to the appointment of coun-
sel to indigent defendants. Under Michigan law, if defen-
dant established indigency and the risk of incarceration,
then he would have been entitled to the benefit of coun-
sel. Under tribal law, a defendant receives no such guar-
antee. Instead, a defendant only receives the benefit of
counsel at his own expense. Preliminarily we note that
Michigan law does not require that all process be identi-
cal. Rather, we review in its entirety the process afforded
defendant in the foreign jurisdiction for an intolerably
high risk of unfairness. In the present case, the substan-
tive laws in question are identical, the procedural protec-
tions afforded in the foreign jurisdiction are generally
consistent with the procedural protections afforded
under Michigan law and defendant was found to have
made a knowing, free and voluntary waiver of the many
rights that were expressly explained to him in order to
tender a plea of guilty. Thus, it would not be without rea-
son to conclude, regardless of defendant’s indigency sta-
tus, that defendant was afforded sufficient due process in
the foreign jurisdiction to allow the use of the foreign
convictions for purposes of enhancing the charge against
defendant.83
A second issue involves the question of whether the tribe in
a prior conviction has provided access to “lay advocates,” or
law-trained individuals who are not licensed attorneys. Judge
Kornmann’s flat rejection of the quality of lay advocates – they
do not “cut it”84 – seems reasonable for tribal court convictions
resulting in jail time.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the coming years, state and federal judges will increas-
ingly be confronted with prosecutors introducing prior tribal
court convictions for sentencing and enhancement purposes.
This article hopefully provides a sufficient overview of the rea-
sons why tribal court convictions are becoming more prevalent,
why tribal court convictions usually should be entitled to
comity, and what kinds of tribal court convictions should be
examined carefully (namely, uncounseled convictions).
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